The democratic peace literature has convincingly shown that democracies do not fight other democracies. Theoretical explanations of this empirical phenomenon often claim that the citizenry in democracies prefers peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts. Still, there is a dearth of studies exploring the public's preferences and values directly. We seek to rectify this by investigating, in a novel way, the relationship between regime type and citizens' bellicosity. A comprehensive multilevel research design is employed, with data spanning 72 countries over the period 1981-2008. This enables us to test one of the theoretical mainstays of the democratic peace thesis, viz., that regime type helps shape individuals' attitudes toward war-fighting. Our results lend special support to normative democratic peace theory: Citizens of democracies are significantly more pacifistic than citizens of non-democracies. This result upholds when we rigorously control for other relevant factors, including specific characteristics of individuals and rival theoretical explanations.
Introduction
The empirical literature on the democratic peace confidently contends that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against or find themselves embroiled in militarised disputes with other democracies. 1 There is less agreement, however, on the question of why democracies maintain peaceful relations among each other.
There are two dominant strands of theoretical explanations of the alleged democratic peace: institutional (structural) and normative theories. Institutional or structural theory argues that institutional traits in democraciessuch as free elections and a separation of powers -work to constrain the political leaders' scope of action, thereby acting as a check on any adventurous foreign-policy endeavours by the leadership. 2 Normative theory, for its part, claims that citizens in well-established (liberal) democracies harbour 'democratic-pacifistic' values and norms. These norms, in turn, are externalised to foreign affairs, reducing the likelihood that state goals will be pursued by violent means. 3 Both these purported mechanisms are particularly held to be valid in relations among democracies. A dyadic democratic peace arises not least because the mutual trust between democracies ameliorates the security dilemma and the escalation potential in interstate conflicts and crises.
Given the presumed direct or indirect influence of the citizenry on foreign policy, it is somewhat unfortunate that there is a dearth of studies exploring the public's preferences and values directly. Although valuable exceptions do exist, primarily in the form of experimental studies, 4 the bulk of empirical research investigates the relationship between regime type and states' participation in war or militarised disputes at a high level of aggregation. The present paper also uses regime type as its main independent variable. Our dependent variable, though, which is extracted from the World Values Survey, measures citizens' preferences and attitudes towards participation in war. We employ a comprehensive multilevel research design and statistical analysis, using data at the individual as well as the country-year and country level for the period 1981-2008. This enables us to testmore directly and in a novel wayone of the theoretical mainstays of the democratic peace thesis, viz., that regime type per se helps shape individuals' attitudes towards war-fighting.
Our results indicate that it does: Citizens of democracies are significantly more pacifistic than citizens of non-democracies. This result upholds when we rigorously control for other relevant factors, including specific characteristics of individuals and variables linked to rival theoretical explanations, notably realism and economic or commercial peace theory. Democracies, qua democracies, are really more peaceful than non-democracies, and this democratic peace seems to be rooted first and foremost in the norms and values of the democratic citizen.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the main empirical findings and theoretical arguments of the democratic peace literature, and it examines criticisms of the thesis. The subsequent section presents methods and data. Thereafter we exhibit and analyse the empirical evidence, while we in the last section discuss the results and conclude.
Other?: An Experimental Study ', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37:3 (1993) , pp. 484-503; Michael Tomz and Jessica L. Weeks, 'Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace', American Journal of Political Science, 107:4 (2013) , pp. 849-65.
Democratic peace: The literature
Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay Perpetual Peace is still rightfully regarded as the fundamental text of the democratic peace literature. 5 His ideas about the democratic or liberal peace 6 were explicitly resurrected some three decades ago, particularly by Michael Doyle. 7 The latter's theoretical studies followed Dean Babst, 8 who (without citing Kant) emphatically highlighted the peacefulness of democratic regimes.
Subsequent literature on the democratic peace has truly been voluminous. 9 This is especially so in terms of empirical studies, which are relatively conclusive that a dyadic 5 Immanuel Kant, Principles of Politics and Perpetual Peace, trans. W. Hastie (Boston, MA: Digireads, 2010) . 6 Democratic peace is usually viewed as a key constituent element of liberal peace or Kantian peace, which highlights Kant's emphasis of the peace-bolstering role played by 'republics' (democracies) as well as by interstate trade and international organisation. For a comprehensive elaboration of the Kantian peace triangle, see Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001) . 7 Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12:3 (1983), pp. 205-35; Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics'. 8 Dean V. Babst, 'Elective Governments -a Force for Peace ', Wisconsin Sociologist, 3:1, For recent reviews of the literature, see Anna Geis and Wolfgang Wagner, 'How Far Is It from conflicts of interest are resolved peacefully, and where individual freedoms are thoroughly respected. (2) These norms of behaviour are normally externalised to the realm of foreign affairs. This imbues relationships between and among democracies with a level of reciprocal trust and respectand a mutual belief that the use or threat of force is not on the agenda for either party even in times of crisisthat is not present in any other ideal-type dyad. A dyadic democratic peace thereby arises.
There is some divergence within the literature concerning what liberal or democratic norms really entail. Some hold that such norms both reflect and help cause the socialisation of the democratic public and the democratic elites into appreciating that all domestic conflicts should and must be resolved peacefully. 13 ', International Security, 19:2 (1994), pp. 87-125. 16 Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1152. the argument that all humans enjoy the right to be treatedand have an obligation to treat othersas ends and not as mere means. The use of violence and coercion against others negates their fundamental rights, and these are therefore to be considered illiberal tools.
The second leg of the normative school extends the argument about the conflictmitigating role of democratic norms and claims its validity at the foreign-policy arena as well. Yet, there is purportedly a dual logic at play here. Outcomes of peace, militarisation and war critically hinge on whether a dyad in question is like (that is, containing two democracies) or unlike (that is, containing one democracy and one nondemocracy). 17 This dual logic, moreover, may satisfactorily account for why the dyadic democratic peace thesis enjoys more empirical credence than the monadic one. 18 In like (democratic) dyads, the same normatively-founded practices of peaceful conflict resolution that are present domestically ostensibly also operate in foreign affairs. This creates a basis for mutual trust and respect that is built on the common knowledge that both states' foreign policies renounce the use of violence to settle disputes. 19 What emerges, then, is a reciprocal belief that the age-old wisdom about war being the ultimate arbiter does not apply in democratic dyads. Inasmuch as this is true, one of the most commonly-cited basic causes of interstate war and militarised 17 In terms of outcomes, the third possible optiona like dyad consisting of two non-democraciesbasically yields the same expectations as an unlike dyad. 18 ', World Politics, 44:4 (1992) , pp.
573-99.
conflictthe security dilemma and its related spiral effectsis simply removed as a relevant factor in such dyads.
On the other hand, a similar mutual trust does not apply to unlike dyads, and therefore the security dilemma and spiral dynamics persist in relations between democracies and non-democracies. It is exactly the democracy's expectationor, in any case, fearthat the non-democracy will consider the use or threat of military force as a bargaining tool which spurs the democracy to make the same considerations. In this view, the escalatory potential in a conflict between a democracy and a nondemocracy has no obvious stopping point short of war; hence, a literal externalisation of democratic-pacifistic norms by the democracy might be self-defeating and potentially catastrophic.
Democratic peace: Institutional theory
Institutional or structural arguments make up the second main strand of democratic peace theory. Two primary claims are made. 20 Firstly, the separation of powers that characterises democracies circumscribes the scope of action of political leaders, effectively acting as a check on any decision to move the country along the path to war. Secondly, the democratic public is loath to carry the human and material costs of war; it will therefore punish belligerent leaders at the ballot box or through other democratic mechanisms. 20 It is noteworthy that these arguments are associated with both a monadic and a dyadic logic. At the dyadic level, the reasoning closely resembles that of normative theory (but for the difference in assumptions about root causes): The security dilemma and with it, the likelihood of escalation and warin democratic dyads is significantly mitigated considering that both parties understand and trust that the decision-making process of the other is also subject to institutional constraints.
As for the monadic level, the checks and balances operating in democracies should work to block decisions to go to war irrespective of the nature of the adversary's regime. 21 This is so not least considering that the underlying logic of the institutional arguments centres critically on the costs of war. Following Kant 22who emphasised the public's unwillingness to 'fight in their own persons', to 'supply the costs of war', to 'repair [its] devastation' and to take on the resulting 'burden of debt'there is only a fine line separating parts of the institutional logic from the reasoning underpinning economic or commercial peace theory, 23 which is intimately related to a broader Kantian peace.
The monadic democratic peace thesis receives scant empirical support, however. 24 Attempts to unravel this conundrum have taken three basic forms. Firstly, as explicated above, the dyadic logic may trump the monadic one bearing in mind the unforgiving nature of the security dilemma (in non-democratic dyads) and the 21 show that a lack of commonalities between cultures and regimes heightens citizens' perceived levels of threat, ultimately bolstering justifications for war. 27
Critique of the democratic peace
The democratic peace thesis has received a fair amount of criticism. Empirically, question marks have been raised with regard to the quantitative research designs and coding practices typically employed by scholars. 28 Othersthat is, adherents of economic or commercial peace theorybelieve that democratic peace is really a spurious artifact of, or at least significantly conditioned by, economic variables. 29 is so, they say, considering that democracies typically also tend to be wealthy capitalist countries that are deeply integrated into the world economy through sophisticated trade and investment ties.
Furthermore, International Relations realists typically emphasise the consequential impact of relative power with regards to questions of war and peace.
Christopher Layne's 30 oft-cited study is usefully representative. His analysis of four famous cases of severe democratic-dyadic crises that never escalated into war proper ends in the conclusion that democracy per se had little or no bearing on any of the outcomes; according to Layne, perceptions of relative powerand the associated estimations of the likelihood of victoryultimately determined that peace in the end prevailed.
A second, related line of reasoning accentuates the importance of the relative distribution of capabilities globally. Specifically, U.S. hegemony or near-hegemony since the Second World War has witnessed one superpower, and a starkly liberaldemocratic one to boot, dominating the security affairs in several vital regions, notably the Americas and Western Europe. Reflecting ideas associated with hegemonic stability theoryin particular its security-centred version 31the argument is that it is in the self-interest of the liberal hegemon to ensure that key regions are peaceful, stable and devoid of any serious security competition. 32 
Methods and data

Multilevel analysis
In the next main section, we present and analyse results from a multilevel logistic regression analysis spanning 72 countries for the period 1981-2008. 33 For such modelling, transformations from logit to probability follow the same rules as in ordinary logit regression. The multilevel technique entails that the statistical models are constructed in a hierarchical fashion where some of the units constitute a subgroup of other units. 34 The objective of multilevel analyseswhich are sometimes called hierarchical linear models, random effects models or random coefficient modelsis to account for variance in a dependent variable measured at the lowest level, by investigating information from all levels of analysis. 35 This yields some substantial advantages especially given this paper's main theoretical argument, which presumes that regime type per se helps shape individuals' attitudes toward war-fighting. In such instances, multilevel models are particularly helpful, as they take into account the varying (country-and regional-level) contexts of the individuals under study, which other statistical approaches normally cannot do. 36 The analysis merges data from three different levels: individual, country-year and country. 37 The first level (Level 1) consists of individual characteristics that we expect condition considerable parts of each respondent's willingness to fight for his or her country. All individual-level dataincluding the dependent variableare extracted from the World Values Survey (WVS), a global research project that assembles and maps out the values and attitudes of representative samples of (adult) citizens from a broad range of countries, using rigorous sampling procedures that do not vary between countries or over time. 38 The WVS data are based on face-to-face interviews of citizens from, if we consider all survey waves, close to 100 countries, which together account for nearly 90 per cent of the world's population. The inclusion of countries is primarily based on the availability of funding. This, of course, leads to a less-than-perfect country sample. Still, the World Values Survey constitutes by far the most comprehensive global survey sample in existence. Notably, recent WVS waves include particularly 36 As our main concern is with the coefficient estimates, and since we are running large and complex models, we use the Laplacian approximation to calculate our models. Laplace approximation is equivalent to modelling curvature adaptive Gaussian quadrature with one integration point. 37 The regressions were run in Stata (version 13), employing a random intercept model. 38 For a further elaboration of the WVS methodology and sampling procedures, see World Values
Survey's home page, at: {http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/}. The datasets are made available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither Ronald Inglehart, WVS or NSD are responsible for the analysis or interpretations made in this article. heterogeneous samples of countries with respect to, inter alia, regime type, level of development, conflict-proneness and region. 39 The WVS data come in five waves: 40 (1) 1981-1984; (2) 1989-1993; (3) 1994-1999; (4) 1999-2004; (5) 418-34. 40 A sixth WVS wave was released at the time of writing. 41 Despite that there are five WVS waves, the number of units at Level 2 is only slightly double that of Level 3. This is primarily due to variations in the number of countries surveyed in each wave. In addition, some of the survey questions that form the basis of our individual-level data are not included for certain country-years. 42 On the basis of a so-called empty model, we estimated the share of variance attributable to each of the three levels. Level 1 accounts for 86.8%; Level 2 = 3.5%; and Level 3 = 9.7%. The relatively low share attributable to Level 2 likely obtains because country-specific characteristics usually change only slowly over time; Level 3 presumably captures a substantial portion of this variance. N at Levels 2 and 3 substantially increases our confidence in the robustness of any significant statistical results at these levels.
A case can be made for limiting the number of country-level or country-yearlevel variables in statistical analyses in general. Some argue that the problem of 'omitted-variable bias' is often greatly exaggerated and that the problem of confounding or confusing resultsespecially if spuriousness is a concerncan best be alleviated by constructing statistical models in an incremental fashion and paying particular heed to the importance of theory for the identification of control variables. 43 Others are less inclined to place limits on the number of independents in single models so long as sound theory guides the choice of variables. 44 While we do not take any strong stand in this debate, the nature of our data induces us to follow, in large part, the 'incremental' approach with regards to Level 2 variables. We thus proceed to construct an appropriate base model. In the reported models, we thereafter systematically test if the relationship between regime type and citizens' bellicosity changes with the orderly inclusion (and removal) of one or a few other potential causal factors at a time (for descriptive statistics, see Appendix A). 45 45 Of course, this strategy also lessens any concerns about multicollinearity, which tolerance tests, in any case, show is not an issue (with the partial exception for those models which include interaction variables, where tolerance values range between 0.16 and 0.28; that is, at levels that are generally models, we expand the selection of variables (at the country-year level) in each individual model; these results are described in the sensitivity-analysis section.
Dependent variable
The dichotomous dependent variable -Bellicosityis based on the following WVS survey question: Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (yes=1; no=0).
Presuming that country-specific factorsin particular regime typehelp shape willingness to fight, our hypothesis is that pacifistic norms and values are more prevalent in democratic polities than in non-democratic ones.
Bellicosity is, as far as we know, the most suitableand indeed onlyexisting measure that allows for such a comprehensive, multilevel investigation of normative democratic peace. Still, the breadth and scope of the question posed to respondents present some challenges. Firstly, criticism has been raised with regard to the prelude to the question ('Of course, we all hope...'); 46 the normative tint to these words may direct respondents into answering in the negative. However, the wording of the question does not differ between countries (all questions are translated to the local language of relevance), so we do not have reason to believe that such a bias affects scores more in some countries than in others. Besides, any general bias does not considered just acceptable). For example, correlations between the six individual-level variables are generally fairly low; the highest -0.23is between Trust in military and National pride. Tolerance level for all non-interaction variables are above 0.70. 46 Stephen Gibson and Nathalie Noret, 'Historical Experiences, Collective Memory, and Willingness to seem to be that great; the overall sample mean is high (0.72). 47 In addition, even if the extent to which an individual is predisposed to answering 'no', such a predisposition likely rests on other individual characteristics, which we duly control for in the empirical analysis.
Secondly, the question does not specify whether this is about defensive or offensive war. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that even those individuals who harbour 'pacifistic' values could be just as willing to fight for their country as less pacifistic individuals would be, if self-defense can help ensure state survival. These concerns about validity should nonetheless be substantially mitigated given that we also control for 'national pride' (please see variable description below). As it is, social psychologists distinguish between 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'. 48 The former concept depicts 'love for the home country', the latter 'hostility toward others'. 49 The variable National pride, considering how the survey question is formulated, 50 therefore presumably reflects the less aggressive notion of 'nationalism'; thus it usefully controls 47 Indeed, snapshots of scores on the dependent variable do suggest that there are mechanisms present that cannot be explained by any systematic bias in the data. For example, national scores on Bellicosity for three of the liberal-democratic Nordic countries -Norway, Sweden and Finlandare quite high (always above 0.83). This is likely due to their proximity to Russia/USSR or, relatedly, to the existence of military conscription. We account for such mechanisms in the empirical analysis. for much of the dimension of Bellicosity that concerns the willingness to fight for one's country in self-defense. We are therefore reasonably confident that any eventual correlation between regime type and Bellicosity by and large reflects individuals' attitudes towards other types of war scenarios, which would strengthen our belief that our dependent variable is truly a measure of pacifism.
A third possible concern is that Bellicosity might in part proxy the state's or regime's legitimacy among the populace. Hence, results for some of the nondemocratic regimes on Bellicosity might turn out lower than those which can be deemed 'real' values in an exclusive normative perspective, since we have reason to assume that democratic regimes enjoy a higher level of legitimacy among its people than do autocratic ones. On the other hand, our study should remain relatively unaffected by this considering that we expect that non-democratic regimes will exhibit higher scores than democratic ones on Bellicosity.
Independent variables, Level 2: Normative democratic peace
Following the majority of quantitative studies on democratic peace, our main independent variable is a measure of democracy extracted from the Polity IV Project democracy (+1 to +7) and Autocracy (-10 to 0). This categorisation allows us more easily to perform a number of additional tests that require the inclusion of relevant interaction variables and whose results can more readily be interpreted when dummy variables for regime type are used. However, the continuous version of the Polity Index Empirical studies have found that the majority of wars and militarised crises involve disputes over territory between neighbouring countries. 54 Therefore, and in order to investigate the dyadic democratic peace thesis more closely, we constructed variables that test if Bellicosity depends on the regime type of neighbouring states. 
Independent variables, Level 2: Institutional democratic peace, economic peace and realism
We must account for economic or commercial peace theory, which in important respects reflects dimensions inherent in institutional democratic peace theory as well.
We therefore control five economic variables at Level 2. The first four of these we expect to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable. GDP per capita (based on constant 2000 US$ and logarithmically transformed) proxies level of development.
Data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) . 59 To test the peace-through-interdependence thesis, we also control level of trade integration (Trade, which is the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP) and inward foreign direct investment as a share of GDP (Foreign direct investment). Data are from the WDI. The fourth variable is Economic freedom, which usefully accounts for the capitalist peace thesis. This index is based on several indicators measuring the level of domestic economic liberalisation. 60 The fifth variable -Economic growthmeasures the yearly growth rate of the national economy (data are from the WDI).
Variables linked to key arguments of the realist paradigm must also be controlled. Firstly, we include a dummy variable that distinguishes between (regional) major and non-major powers. Realist scholars typically see international politics as a story 'written in terms of the great powers of an era'. 61 dummy variable Regional major power recalculates from the global to the regional level the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), the standard measure of relative aggregate power. 63 Country-years accounting for at least 5 per cent of total material capabilities in their own region obtain the value 1 on Regional major power. 64 The second set of measures of the balance of power reflects the argument that neighbouring countries represent more prominent threats than distant ones, ceteris paribus. More or less following the operationalisation of Stuart Bremer 65thus suspecting that relative power might be related to Bellicosity in a non-linear waywe chose to construct three dummy variables that classify nations according to their relative power vis-à-vis their most powerful neighbour. These are based on data from the Correlates of War project (Direct Contiguity Data and CINC). A power ratio of less than or equal to 3 is regarded as a small power difference (such countries receive the score of 1 on Power difference small); a power ratio between 3 and 10 yields the score of 1 on Power difference medium (reference category); while a ratio of over 10 is judged to be large (Power difference large).
Alliances, security guarantees, extended deterrence and the overseas deployment of troops could certainly also impact citizens' willingness to fight, and they might also account for a substantial portion of the purported relationship between 63 regime type and war. 66 In particular, U.S. troops deployment couldthrough freeriding, buck-passing or trip-wire mechanismsreduce the incentives of host-country citizens to fight for their own country. 67 In the base model we therefore include a dummy variable that is coded 1 for country-years that host at least 1,000 U.S. troops (US troops). Data are from the Heritage Foundation. 68 We also include, in one of the models, a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if a country is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, we include a variable that should effectively control for the degree to which a country is 'militarised'. Troops per capita measures the relative size of the army, with data from the WDI. This variable should also be a potent control for any possible effects of national conscription on Bellicosity.
Independent variables -Levels 3 and 1
At Level 3the country levelwe control for temporally static factors. We constructed five regional dummy variables: America, Asia, Africa, Middle East and the reference category Europe (please see footnote 64 above for definitions of the regions). The assumption here is that the average values on Bellicosity might be significantly shaped by the regional security environment, 69 which in turn should be shaped by the ( Lastly, we also control for six individual-level variablesextracted from WVSthat the specialised literature on political behaviour informs us are theoretically advisable to include. 71 Age is a continuous variable believed to be negatively associated with Bellicosity. Also included is a dummy variable controlling for gender (Male); a four-category variable measuring the extent to which the individual has faith in the country's military (Trust in military); a variable measuring respondents' tolerance of societal diversity (Tolerance); and a control for personal income (Income), which is measured on a 10-point scale.
Lastly, we control for National pride, a four-category variable that measures the emotional ties between citizens and their country. Others have shown this to be strongly related to our dependent variable. 72 As we have argued above, National pride will vitally function as a control for the dimension of Bellicosity which concerns willingness to fight for one's country in self-defense. In addition, and in order to check if democratic citizens are less susceptible to embrace belligerent hyper-nationalism, instead opting to express national pride in other, more peaceful ways, we also include two interaction variables in one of our models (Full demo*National pride and Semidemo*National pride, with Auto*National pride being the reference category). We do not place much emphasis on the results for the control variables at Level 1, primarily because most of these are of little theoretical interest given the focus of our study. In terms of direction, most results are as expected. The one distinct exception is Income, whose coefficient is positive, contradicting the supposition that citizens are particularly sensitive to the (opportunity) costs of war.
Empirical analysis
Moving on to Level 3, the regional dummies show an interesting albeit more or less expected pattern. As the realism-affiliated hegemonic stability theory would suggest, America is negative and significantand often highly soin all of the 16 models. Also note that Africa generally obtains the strongest negative impact of all regional dummies. This, we surmise, likely reflect persistent challenges with statebuilding in Sub-Saharan African countries, the bulk of which are highly ethnically fractionalised. Neither Asia nor Middle East differ significantly from the reference category Europe. Results are as expected: Full democracy is strongly linked with Bellicosity. A somewhat weaker, but still significant (at the .05 level) result obtains for Semi-democracy, further suggesting a linear relationship between regime type and willingness to fight.
In model 1d we proceed to include US troops as a control. We keep this variable in all subsequent models. We do this in part because preliminary analyses showed a strong and consistent relationship between U.S. troops deployment and Bellicosity.
This can be down to several reasons. U.S. military presence and attendant security guarantees should contribute to decreasing host-country citizens' incentives to fight for their country, ceteris paribus. In addition, Japan and Germany are both hosts to a large number of U.S. military bases, and these two countries' World War II experiences have most likely affected the general level of pacifism for generations. 73 Considering also that states with a substantial U.S. military presence have a high average level of democracy, the inclusion of US troops is vital as a check for spuriousness between regime type and Bellicosity. As model 1d shows, the coefficient of US troops is negative and highly significant. This substantiates the story told by the regional dummy America, 73 Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel, 'The Individual-level Basis of the Long Peace ', p. 432. suggesting in particular that citizens of countries whose basic defense and security needs are 'outsourced' to the U.S. hegemon are imbued with a high level of pacifism, all else being equal. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, however, the inclusion of US troops does not change the impact of Democracy Polity. So far, then, the empirical analysis has lent support to key arguments of normative democratic peace theory: The more democratic the regime, the more pervasive are pacifistic attitudes and values among the citizenry. Table 2 exhibits additional tests of democratic peace theory, using the regime dummies in the first three models. Firstly, the longevity of the democratic regime might affect the degree to which democratic-pacifistic norms and values are internalised among citizens. 74 This contention does not receive support here, however. If we jointly consider the coefficients for Regime stability and the interaction variable Full demo*Regime stability, as we must, it is clear that Bellicosity is more or less unaffected by the maturity of democracy (whereas bellicosity increases with the longevity of autocracies). This does not automatically mean that we need to refute the claims made by Maoz and Russett, though. Perhaps this instead reflects the strictness of criteria associated with the label 'full democracy'. Once a country has reached the level where it is included in this category, it may very well already have gotten to a point where democratic-pacifistic values are so entrenched as to make them virtually unmovableat least for as long as the democracy itself upholds.
Democratic peace: Additional tests and interactions
Model 2b includes a test of possible interaction effects between regime type and
National pride. The first interaction variable -Full demo*National pridediffers 74 Maoz and Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace'. significantly (at the .05 level) from the reference category, whereas the second one -Semi-demo*National pridedoes not. However, the very large N associated with National pride renders significant a difference (between democracies and autocracies) that in reality is close to negligible. Thus, these results show that the regression slope of democracies approximates that of non-democracies. This boosts our confidence that National pridethe way it is measured -does not encompass an 'aggressive' component of any note; if it had, we would have expected the regression slope of autocracies to be much steeper than that of democracies, reflecting a dearth of other, alternative outlets for any 'hyper-nationalism' among non-democratic citizens.
Model 2c attempts to test the dyadic democratic peace thesis more concretely.
It includes four additional Level 2 variables, namely two dummies capturing the nature of the least democratic neighbouring regime and two attendant interaction variables.
Results do indicate that willingness to fight depends on the neighbourhood being fully democratic or not; having an autocratic neighbour does indeed increase overall willingness to fight for one's country. But this conclusion is only valid for semidemocracies and, in particular, for autocracies; for democracies there is no such effect.
It is still debatable whether we should place too much emphasis on these results. There are three problems in this respect. Firstly, tolerance tests revealed that multicollinearity might render somewhat difficult the interpretation of those models which include interaction effects (for tolerance scores, please see footnote 45 above). Secondly, coding did not allow for considerations of relative power (it certainly makes a difference whether your neighbour is autocratic Brunei or autocratic Russia). Thirdly, these variables may also suffer from a lack of variation considering that democraciesin particular those included in the WVS datatend to cluster together in purported 'zones of peace'. In sum, as tests of the democratic peace, we are inclined to place far more faith in the basic regime variables.
Model 2d returns to such a more basic outlook. There, we include a measure of human development to check if quality of life can account for the positive relationship between democracy and the dependent variable. But although Human Development Index is negative and significant, as expected, the strength of regime type upholds. In sum, therefore, and although the significance level of Full democracy is suppressed in models 2a and 2c, presumably because that variable is also included in the interaction terms, Table 2 ought to give us increased confidence in the empirical validity of normative democratic peace theory.
Democratic peace vs economic peace and realism
Previous models have shown that personal income is positively associated with Bellicosity. Table 3 provides further tests of whether results on normative democratic peace uphold when economic factors are controlled. And they do. Full democracy is consistently and negatively related to the dependent variable, at a high level of significance, even when we include measures of national income and economic growth (model 3a); trade integration (3b); foreign direct investment (3c); and economic freedom (3d). There is nothing in our results to indicate, therefore, that the relationship between democracy and pacifism is a spurious artefact of economic variables. On the other hand, most economic variables do seem to have an independent effect on willingness to fight; in particular, GDP per capita, Foreign direct investment and Economic freedom are all highly significantly associated with Bellicosity, with the expected signs. This indicates (albeit with Income representing an individual-level caveat in that its direction is unexpected) that economic prosperity and inter-state linkages also lower the propensity for violence. A democratic peace, in other words, does not rule out an attendant commercial peace, as the second leg of Kant's tripod would suggest.
The last set of models, depicted in Table 4 , includes controls related to the realist paradigm. Yet again results suggest that the findings on normative democratic peace are robust. Firstly, as shown in model 4a, Regional major power is negatively related to the dependent measure (although only weakly so). Perhaps this result comes about because major powers hardly need to be concerned about survival, which is the fundamental goal of any state. Model 4b includes measures of relative power, but this does not alter the effect of Democracy Polity. It is noteworthy that power differences vis-à-vis one's strongest neighbour are linked to the dependent variable in a non-linear way; coefficients of both Power difference small and Power difference large are positive, with the latter being highly significant. Presumably, considering how these variables are coded, this reflects that the states in the middle category do not normally have to fear for their survival (their inferiority is evident yet still somewhat limited), and neither is the power gap so small as to spur any 'natural' regional rivalry. Model 4c follows the same logic as that which applies for US troops. That NATO is significant at a low level (.10), while US troops remains significant (at the .05 level), is not surprising given that the physical presence of the U.S. hegemon represents a particularly credible, trip wire-like signal to the host country that its security is tightly connected to Washington's. Lastly, model 4d includes a measure of 'militarisation'. Troops per capita, which should also capture eventual effects of conscription on Bellicosity, is not significant, however. Again, the strong result on Democracy Polity upholds.
Sensitivity analysis
To further ensure the robustness of our results, we performed a number of additional tests, not least including variables that could possibly account for some of the observed relationship between Democracy Polity and Bellicosity. Firstly, we ran all our models using robust standard errors instead of multilevel modelling, which did not change any Cross-Cultural Psychology, 39:4 (2008) Lastly, we expanded all our main models, exploring the effects of including several Level 2 variables simultaneously in a variety of different combinations, also adding a temporal control (which was insignificant). Interestingly, expanding the models did alter some of the results. In particular, nearly all effects of the economic peace variables disappeared. The 'realist' variablesnotably US troops and the power-differences variableswere left unaltered. The same was true for the regime variablesboth in their continuous and dummy versionswhich have proven to be consistently and negatively linked to Bellicosity.
Conclusion
The empirical analysis, as a whole, lends considerable support to normative democratic peace arguments. The more democratic a regime, the more prevalent are 77 We coded the variable ourselves based on information from Internet sources, including the CIA World Firstly, the analysis corroborates key arguments of the realist paradigm, while at the same time rendering results on the regime variables unaltered. Local balances of power (the dummies for power differences), regional balances of power (regional dummies) and security and defense guarantees by the U.S. hegemon (proxied by overseas deployment of U.S. troops and a NATO membership dummy) all significantly impact the willingness of citizens to fight for their country.
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